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Abstract: Many previous experiments have found that participants invest more in risky assets if 
they see their returns less frequently, see portfolio-level (rather than segregated asset-by-asset) 
returns, or see long-horizon (rather than one-year) historical asset class return distributions. In 
contrast to these other studies, we find that such aggregated returns disclosure does not increase 
equity allocations in an experiment where—in contrast to previous experiments—participants 
invest in real mutual funds over the course of one year. We show that previously documented 
aggregation effects are sensitive to the distribution of the risky asset’s returns and how much 
time elapses between the portfolio choice and the viewing of the returns. 
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A remarkable series of experiments has found that participants are more willing to invest 
in risky assets with positive expected returns if only aggregated returns are reported to them, 
rather than the individual component returns. Information aggregation along various dimensions 
produces this effect: reporting participants’ long-horizon portfolio returns at infrequent intervals 
rather than short-horizon returns every period (Gneezy and Potters, 1997; Thaler et al., 1997; 
Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters, 2003; Bellemare et al., 2005; Haigh and List, 2006; Sutter, 2007; 
Langer and Weber, 2008; Fellner and Sutter, 2009; Erikson and Kvaløy, 2010a, 2010b; van der 
Heijden et al., 2012), reporting participants’ portfolio-level returns rather than returns for each 
individual asset separately (Anagol and Gamble, 2013), or reporting historical long-horizon 
return distributions of asset classes rather than historical one-year return distributions of asset 
classes (Benartzi and Thaler, 1999).
1 
These results are predicted by myopic loss aversion (Benartzi and Thaler, 1995)—the 
combination of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and mental accounting (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1985, 1990, 1999)—if aggregation frames encourage participants to 
integrate multiple gamble outcomes into a single mental account.
2 When positive-expected-value 
gambles are not perfectly correlated, the sum of their outcomes is usually less likely to be a loss 
than is each outcome individually.
3 Thus, integrating multiple gambles into a single mental 
account makes them more attractive to a loss-averse individual than if each gamble occupied its 
own separate mental account. 
The strength and consistency of the experimental results constitute compelling evidence 
that information aggregation can increase risk-taking. In this paper, we consider a related but 
separate question: Would a financial institution increase the portfolio risk-taking of its clients if 
it started disclosing returns at a more aggregated level? Numerous authors have extrapolated 
from the existing experimental literature to suggest that the answer to this question is “yes.”
4 
                                                 
1 Guiso (2009) examines another aggregation manipulation that we do not test in this paper. He finds that asking 
subjects about their labor income risk before offering a hypothetical lottery makes them more likely to accept the 
lottery. 
2 Loss-averse agents derive utility and disutility directly from gains and losses, and the disutility of a loss is greater 
than the utility of a gain of equivalent magnitude. Agents engage in mental accounting when they evaluate outcomes 
within a subset of their wealth portfolio—the “mental account”—in isolation from outcomes outside the mental 
account. 
3 Aggregating gambles does not decrease the probability of an overall loss for all return distributions. But the loss 
probability does decrease, for example, when the aggregated gambles are drawn from the same normal distribution.  
4 For example, Thaler et al. (1997) write, “Decisions made by employees covered by such [defined contribution 
pension] plans may vary considerably depending on how their investment opportunities are described and the   2 
However, the typical investment environment differs in many ways from the laboratory 
environment of previous experiments. For example, the experiments to date have been conducted 
over the course of one short session, but the typical investment horizon is many years. Most 
previous experiments have used laboratory assets whose return distributions differ from the 
return distributions of typical financial assets. Previous experimenters have had their 
participants’ undivided attention, along with complete control over information flows during the 
experiment, whereas aggregation manipulations by a single institution in a typical investment 
environment must contend with background information flows and inattention. These and other 
differences may blunt the effect of aggregation manipulations on portfolio choices outside the 
laboratory. 
We conducted an experiment that comes closer to simulating a typical investment 
environment. We recruited 597 participants from the general U.S. adult population to participate 
in a year-long study. Each participant allocated $325 among four real mutual funds that cover the 
U.S. equity, international equity, U.S. bond, and U.S. money market asset classes. Participants 
were free to reallocate their portfolio throughout the year, just as if they were making real 
investments in these mutual funds. We paid each participant whatever the $325 would have been 
worth at the end of the year if the money had been invested according to his or her choices. The 
large per-participant payment ensured that participants remained interested in their experimental 
portfolio through the end of a one-year experiment. Haigh and List (2005) find that professional 
futures and options traders respond to aggregation manipulations over individual gambles whose 
maximum possible gain is $10 and maximum possible loss is $4, so any null results that we find 
are probably not due to our portfolio stakes being too low. 
We randomly varied the level of information aggregation along four dimensions. 
The first treatment dimension varied how frequently participants saw their returns by 
paying half of participants to view their weekly returns on our study website once per week and 
paying the other half to view their biannual returns on our website once every six months. We 
paid participants to view their returns on our website rather than simply emailing them their 
returns because emails are easily ignored, which would create less variation in viewing 
                                                                                                                                                           
manner and frequency with which they receive feedback on their returns.” Gneezy and Potters (1997) observe that, 
“Manipulating the evaluation period of prospective clients could be a useful marketing strategy for fund managers.” 
Haigh and List (2005) write that “institutions may have the ability to influence asset prices through changes in their 
information provisioning policies.”   3 
frequency across conditions and reduce our ability to detect a viewing frequency effect on risk-
taking.
5  
The second treatment dimension varied the level of detail participants saw when they 
viewed their weekly or biannual returns. Half of the participants saw only their overall portfolio 
return over the last week or six months. The other half of participants saw the return over the last 
week or six months of each individual asset they were holding. Because a screen available to all 
participants showed the dollar value of each asset in their portfolio, participants in the former 
group could, in theory, calculate their individual asset returns if they remembered the previous 
value of each asset. But we did not provide convenient access to these previous asset values, 
hindering this calculation. Similarly, participants in the latter group could calculate their overall 
portfolio return from their individual asset returns, but we did not perform this calculation for 
them. 
The third treatment dimension varied the historical returns information shown to 
participants. We showed some participants graphs depicting the distribution of real one-year 
returns for U.S. equities, international equities, U.S. bonds, and U.S. money markets from 1971 
to 2007. Others were shown the distributions of real annualized five-year returns for the four 
asset classes over the same time period. We also gave some participants no historical returns 
information at all in order to see whether allocations were affected by seeing any version of the 
returns graphs. 
The fourth treatment dimension varied whether participants who saw the historical 
returns graphs could also access information about the historical performance of mixed 
portfolios. Some participants could only see historical return distributions of four “pure” 
portfolios, each invested 100% in one of the four asset classes offered. Other participants could, 
via a Web interface, see return distributions of portfolios invested in whatever mix of asset 
classes they wished. This latter treatment, which is the backward-looking analogue of the 
previously described overall portfolio return reporting treatment, might make more apparent the 
diversification benefits of holding multiple asset classes, thus encouraging greater investment in 
risky assets. 
                                                 
5 To the extent that real-world return disclosures are more likely to be ignored than our incentivized disclosures, 
which were viewed 87% of the time in the weekly condition and 74% of the time in the biannual condition, varying 
return disclosure frequency outside our experiment will generate even less variation in return viewing frequency, 
resulting in even weaker potential effects on risk-taking.   4 
We find that none of the four aggregation treatments significantly increased risk-taking, 
as measured by the fraction of the portfolio invested in equities. We have enough statistical 
power to reject increases of more than 2 to 4 percentage points, depending on the treatment. Our 
null effects are unlikely to be due to our treatments having no effect on the information 
participants received. There is a significant difference between how often participants in the 
weekly versus biannual return viewing treatments viewed returns on our study website, and 
weekly viewing treatment participants are significantly more likely than biannual viewing 
treatment participants to report in an exit questionnaire that study participation made them see 
market returns more often. We additionally find that showing either the one-year or five-year 
historical returns graphs to participants increased their equity investment by 11 to 12 percentage 
points (relative to participants who were not shown any historical returns), indicating that the 
graphs changed participants’ beliefs about future asset returns. 
Our null effects instead appear to be due to the fact that the aggregation treatment effects 
documented in previous studies are highly sensitive to the risky asset’s return distribution. Our 
experiment in fact replicates the Benartzi and Thaler (1999) result that showing long-horizon 
historical U.S. stock returns increases investment in U.S. stocks relative to showing one-year 
historical U.S. stock returns. But showing long-horizon historical international stock returns 
decreases investment in international stocks, so there is no change in participants’ total equity 
allocations. 
A follow-up experiment demonstrates that the return viewing frequency effect is 
similarly sensitive to the return distribution. We conducted this additional experiment to rule out 
potential confounds and more precisely identify the reasons that our first experiment’s results 
differ from those in the previous literature. We began by successfully replicating the return 
viewing frequency effect of the earlier literature: Seeing ongoing returns less frequently within a 
one-hour laboratory session increased risk-taking when the risky asset had a binary return 
distribution of +250% with 1/3 probability and -100% with 2/3 probability, as is the case in 
Gneezy and Potters (1997) and the many subsequent studies that adopt their experimental design 
(Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters, 2003; Bellemare et al., 2005; Haigh and List, 2006; Sutter, 2007; 
Langer and Weber, 2008; Fellner and Sutter, 2009; Erikson and Kvaløy, 2010a, 2010b; van der 
Heijden et al., 2012). Such a return distribution is much more extreme than that of most common 
financial assets, including the mutual funds in our first experiment. We find that this return   5 
viewing frequency effect disappeared when we changed the risky asset’s return distribution to 
+25% with 1/3 probability and -10% with 2/3 probability while keeping the total potential 
dollars at risk the same by increasing by a factor of 10 the maximum allowable investment in the 
risky asset. Return viewing frequency similarly had no effect when we told participants that the 
risky asset’s return distribution matched the historical U.S. stock market return distribution. 
Even when the risky asset had the binary return distribution of (250%, 1/3; -100%, 2/3), 
we find that the return viewing frequency effect disappeared if the amount of time that elapsed 
between the portfolio choice and the return viewings lengthened. In all previous studies, 
participants saw their returns immediately after making their portfolio choice. We ran 
experimental conditions where participants in the frequent viewing treatment saw their returns 
once per week for three weeks, while participants in the infrequent viewing treatment only saw 
the sum of their three returns three weeks in the future. Return viewing frequency had no effect 
on risk-taking, regardless of the risky asset’s return distribution, when return disclosure was 
delayed like this. 
In summary, we are able to replicate the specific experimental results in the aggregation 
literature. The original Gneezy and Potters (1997) viewing frequency manipulation does increase 
risk taking in our replication analysis. However, when we make the asset allocation problem 
more externally realistic, this aggregation effect vanishes. We also replicate the Benartzi and 
Thaler (1999) finding that viewing longer-horizon historical U.S. equity return distributions 
increases investment in U.S. equities, but we find that the effect reverses for international 
equities. We conclude that the originally identified aggregation effects may not apply to decision 
environments that look more like the ones that investors face, so information aggregation may 
not be a tool that financial institutions can use to robustly affect risk-taking. 
Our paper is related to work that has found that aggregation effects can disappear or 
reverse for certain binary gambles. Langer and Weber (2001, 2005) find that return aggregation 
reduces investment in binary gambles that have a small probability of a large loss. They show 
that this phenomenon is predicted by the diminishing sensitivity to magnitudes and nonlinear 
probability weighting in prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992). Since such gambles most closely resemble bonds, it is unclear from this 
evidence how aggregation would affect overall risk-taking when the investment menu also 
includes stocks. Moeher and Koehler (2010) find that less frequent return viewing increases risk-  6 
taking only when the binary gambles being considered have identical distributions. Financial 
asset returns are approximately identically and independently distributed over time, so this effect 
may have limited applicability to financial market settings. Zeisberger, Langer, and Weber 
(2014) find that if a given experimental subject is switched from one return viewing frequency 
regime to another, the tendency to remain anchored to the risk choices induced by the first 
regime is stronger than the myopic loss aversion effect. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes our first experiment’s 
design, Section II presents the first experiment’s results, and Section III presents robustness 
checks for the first experiment. Section IV describes our follow-up experiment’s design, and 
Section V presents its results. Section VI concludes. 
 
I. Design of the first experiment 
A. Participant recruitment 
  We recruited participants in the summer of 2008 for a one-year investing experiment 
through the market research firm MarketTools. Figure 1 shows the number of participants active 
in the experiment at each calendar date (the gray bars), as well as the level of the S&P 500 
normalized by its July 2, 2007 value (the thin line in the top graph) and the VIX index of 
expected annualized S&P 500 volatility (the thick line in the bottom graph). Even though our 
experiment spanned the market collapse in the fall of 2008, 94% of our participants made their 
initial portfolio choices between June 23, 2008 and July 14, 2008. Ninety-nine percent had 
completed this task by July 30, 2008, and the remaining 1% had completed the task by August 
30, 2008. The market’s precipitous fall did not commence until after the September 15, 2008 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The VIX averaged only 24.5% from June 23 to July 14, 24.1% 
from June 23 to July 30, and 22.6% from June 23 to August 29.
6 These averages are not far from 
the annualized monthly return standard deviation of large-cap equities from 1926 to 2007 of 
20.0% (as reported by Ibbotson Associates), and are far from the VIX levels later in 2008 that 
would herald the arrival of the financial crisis—the VIX rose to 31.7% on September 15, 2008 
and peaked at 80.9% on November 20, 2008. Hence, our participants made their initial portfolio 
allocations in a non-crisis environment, many weeks before we entered a bear market of historic 
proportions. We will discuss in Section III.C evidence that our null treatment effects are not 
                                                 
6 August 30, 2008 was a Saturday.   7 
explained by the market’s 18% decline from its October 2007 peak to the beginning of our 
recruiting period. In addition, the follow-up experiments presented in Sections IV and V show 
that null aggregation effects can be reliably produced outside of a bear market. 
We requested that our participants be at least 25 years old and have an annual income of 
at least $35,000, so that it was more likely that they had some investable assets. All interaction 
with the participants occurred through the Internet; we had no direct contact with them. 
  The initial invitation text introduced the faculty authors with our university affiliations in 
an effort to augment the credibility of the study. It then informed participants that they would 
receive a $20 up-front participation fee for allocating $325 among four mutual funds. At the end 
of one year, we would pay the participants whatever their initial $325 portfolio was worth at that 
time, plus an additional amount for periodically checking their portfolio’s return on the study 
website. The text concluded by telling the participants that we expected the initial portfolio 
allocation to take thirty minutes to an hour, and that it would take no more than thirty minutes to 
an hour of additional time over the course of the next year to check their portfolio’s return. 
  People interested in participating in the study clicked a link that took them to an informed 
consent page that described the task, the compensation scheme, and the expected time 
commitment again. The informed consent document also told participants that they would 
periodically receive e-mails with a link that they could click to see their portfolio’s return, and 
that we would pay them for clicking on these links. 
  Giving informed consent took participants to a registration page where they supplied their 
name and contact information and chose a password. In order to prevent anybody from 
registering for the study more than once, we blocked any attempts to register multiple times from 
the same IP address. Upon registration, an e-mail was sent to each participant with a link to click 
on in order to activate his or her account.
7 The link then took them to a login screen. 
We recruited 600 participants, but three of them did not continue after registering. 
Therefore, our final sample consists of 597 participants, whom we randomly assigned to one of 
eighteen experimental cells. Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample among the 
experimental cells. Treatments varied on four dimensions: whether participants were induced to 
view their returns weekly or biannually; whether ongoing returns were reported to participants at 
                                                 
7 Using an e-mailed activation link ensured that we had an active e-mail account to which we could send the returns-
checking links.   8 
the portfolio level or separately by asset; whether participants saw no graphs, one-year historical 
returns graphs, or five-year historical returns graphs; and whether participants who were shown 
graphs were able to see historical returns of only portfolios invested entirely in a single asset 
class or portfolios that held any mix of asset classes. All participants who did not see a historical 
returns graph had their ongoing returns reported to them at the aggregated portfolio level.
8 The 
remaining treatment assignments are independent of each other. We will describe each 
experimental condition in further detail in Sections I.C and I.F. Online appendix figures show 
representative screenshots from the experimental website. 
 
B. Opening instructions screen 
  After logging in, participants received a fuller description of the study instructions. The 
instructions reiterated the nature of the portfolio allocation task and the compensation scheme, 
and informed participants that they could reallocate their portfolio any time during the year by 
logging into their account on the website. Participants were also told about the inducement to 
view their ongoing returns, as well as the content and frequency of the ongoing returns they 
would be paid to see. In some conditions, participants were introduced to the historical returns 
graphing tool. 
 
C. Historical returns graph treatments 
  For 80% of our participants, the bottom of the instructions screen described above 
introduced a graphing tool that was intended to help them understand the historical real return 
distributions of four asset classes: U.S. equities, international equities, U.S. bonds, and U.S. 
money markets. The remaining 20% of participants did not see the graphing tool and did not 
receive any alternative information on historical returns. The graphs generated by the tool are 
closely modeled after those in Benartzi and Thaler (1999). Returns for an asset class during the 
historical sample period are sorted from lowest to highest and displayed as a bar chart. The 
lowest return is the leftmost bar, and the highest return is the rightmost bar. The median return is 
                                                 
8 We allocated extra subjects to the treatment cells where no historical returns graphs were shown and ongoing 
returns were reported at the portfolio level because these treatments were most similar to the Gneezy and Potters 
(1997) experiment. If we did not replicate their viewing frequency effect in the full sample, we could estimate the 
treatment effect using only these 120 subjects to see if interactions with the historical returns graphs and asset-by-
asset return reporting were responsible for the non-replication. Results on this subsample are consistent with those 
on the full sample, so we do not report them later in the paper.   9 
also highlighted and labeled with its value.
9 We used the S&P 500, MSCI EAFE, Barclays 
Capital Aggregate Bond Index, and 30-day U.S. Treasury bill as our asset class proxies. Because 
the MSCI EAFE series starts in 1970, we cannot use returns prior to 1970 while maintaining 
identical sample periods for all asset classes. The most recent year of returns available at the start 
of the experiment was 2007. In order for each return series to have a unique median, we used the 
period from 1971 to 2007—which has an odd number of years—for all our asset classes.
10  
Participants who had the graphing tool available to them were required to click through 
an animation that explained how to interpret and use the graph before they could proceed to the 
next part of the study. This animation could also be replayed in later screens where the graphing 
tool was shown. 
The graphs varied across treatments along two dimensions. The first dimension was 
whether one-year return distributions or five-year annualized return distributions were shown. 
We used overlapping periods for the five-year distributions, so there were 33 bars shown on the 
five-year graph. The second dimension was whether participants could see only the historical 
return distributions of four “pure” portfolios—each of which is invested 100% in a single asset 
class—or could see the return distribution of any asset class mix they wanted. The graphing tool 
allowed participants to see the return distributions of two different asset classes or portfolios 
side-by-side on the same graph. The vertical axis on all graphs was fixed to range between -40% 
and 70%, so that differential treatment effects across graphs could not be attributed to visual 
scaling effects. 
 
D. Initial portfolio allocation 
Participants made their asset allocations by specifying portfolio percentages to be 
invested in each investment option. For participants who had access to the graphing tool, this 
choice was made after they saw the initial instructions screen and clicked through the animated 
                                                 
9 A programming error caused the bar immediately to the left of the median return to be highlighted instead for the 
first six months of the experiment, even though the correct median return number was displayed in the graph’s label. 
The online appendix figures show the graphs with the shifted highlighting. The discrepancy was not visually 
apparent except in the one-year U.S. equities graph, where the median return was 10.61% but the highlighted bar 
corresponded to a 7.38% return. 
10 In addition, the Barclays Capital index starts in 1976. We constructed our own aggregate bond market index 
returns from 1971 to 1975 by weighting the returns of Ibbotson’s long-term corporate bond, intermediate Treasury, 
and long-term Treasury indexes by the total amount of each type of issue outstanding (as reported by the U.S. 
Treasury) at the end of the prior year.  10 
explanation of the graphing tool. For participants who did not see any historical returns graphs, 
the input boxes for the initial portfolio allocation were below the experimental instructions on the 
first screen. 
Participants could choose among four index funds offered by Northern Funds: the U.S. 
Stock Index Fund, the International Equity Index Fund, the Bond Index Fund, and the Money 
Market Fund.
11 We provided links to each fund’s prospectus. We also informed participants that 
the International Equity Index Fund charges a 2% redemption fee on the sale of shares held for 
less than thirty days.
12 For participants who were shown the historical returns graphs, the 
graphing tool remained accessible on the same screen in which the portfolio allocation was 
entered in order to aid their portfolio decision. Participants could take as long as they wanted to 
make their portfolio decision. We did not (and could not) prevent participants from consulting 
sources of information available outside of our website. 
 
E. Post-allocation questionnaire 
  After participants submitted their initial allocation, they completed a post-allocation 
questionnaire that elicited information on demographics, self-assessed investment knowledge, 
self-assessed confidence about their portfolio allocation, and time preference. We also offered 
participants a gamble with a 50% chance of winning $8 and a 50% chance of losing $5. The 
outcome of the gamble depended on whether the high temperature at San Francisco International 
Airport on a future date, as reported on the National Weather Service website, was an odd or 
even integer. We applied the gains and losses from this gamble to the $20 up-front participation 
fee. Expected utility maximizers with remotely reasonable risk aversion over large-stakes 
gambles should always accept such a small-stakes, positive-expected-value gamble (Rabin, 
2000; Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006). Therefore, participants who refuse the gamble are 
particularly likely to be loss averse and prone to engage in mental accounting. Fehr and Goette 
(2007) show that in a field experiment on labor supply, only workers who rejected a similar 
gamble (50% chance of winning 8 Swiss francs and 50% chance of losing 5 Swiss francs) 
exhibited a negative elasticity of effort per hour with respect to an exogenous increase in the 
                                                 
11 We chose Northern Funds because it was the largest fund family that offered a U.S. equity index fund, an 
international equity index fund, a bond index fund, and a money market fund; did not charge sales loads; did not 
impose redemption fees on non-international funds; and did not impose frequent trading restrictions. 
12 We followed a first-in-first-out (FIFO) convention for determining which shares will incur the redemption fee, as 
real-life mutual funds do.  11 
piece wage rate, consistent with their daily labor supply being determined by loss-averse 
preferences that are evaluated each day with a reference point around a target daily income level. 
Upon finishing the questionnaire, participants were taken to a page that showed their 
current investment allocation and total balance. At this point, participants could log out. On 
subsequent logins to the site that were not initiated by clicking an e-mailed link (described in 
Section I.F), participants would see this portfolio status page first. 
 
F. Ongoing returns viewing treatments 
During the one-year duration of the experiment, half of participants received e-mails once 
a week with a link they could click to view their previous week’s return. These e-mails were sent 
on Saturdays, starting at the end of the participant’s first full calendar week of participation. If 
they clicked the link within a week of receiving the e-mail, we added $1 to their final payment. 
Thus, if they clicked all of the e-mailed links they received during the one-year study, they 
would earn an additional $52. The other half of participants received e-mails once every 26 
weeks with a link they could click to view their prior six-month return. The dates these biannual 
e-mails were sent coincided with when these participants would have otherwise received their 
26th and 52nd e-mails if they had been assigned to receive weekly e-mails. If participants 
receiving biannual e-mails clicked the link within a week of receiving the e-mail, we added $20 
to their final payment.
13 We offered only $20 per viewing for this group because we anticipated 
that participants receiving weekly e-mails would not click on every e-mailed link, and we wanted 
to equalize average return-viewing payments across treatments based on our best guess of 
treatment compliance. 
  Within each of the above two treatments, we varied the level of detail participants saw 
when they clicked on the e-mailed link. Half of participants saw a screen that showed the return 
of each individual asset they held. The other half of participants saw a screen that showed only 
the overall return of their portfolio.
14 These return screens were only accessible via the e-mailed 
link (i.e., they could not be reached by following links within the study website). If a link in a 
                                                 
13 If an e-mail was sent on day t, the link reported returns through day t, even if the link was not clicked until day t + 
n.  
14 When ongoing returns were reported asset by asset, if the e-mail was sent on day t, only assets held on day t were 
included in the returns list. Returns on assets completely liquidated prior to day t were not reported. If a subject 
previously held no position in an asset but established a position sometime between e-mail send dates, the asset 
return reported was for the full period between e-mails (one week or six months) and did not adjust for the fact that 
the asset was held for only part of the time between e-mails.  12 
given e-mail had already been clicked, clicking it again later would not lead to the return screen; 
this was to ensure that participants receiving biannual e-mails did not see the returns screen more 
frequently than once every six months. 
 
G. Treatment of interest, dividends, and trades 
Dividends and interest were automatically reinvested in the fund that paid them.
15 All 
participants were free to reallocate their portfolio at any time during the year by logging into 
their account and clicking a button on the portfolio status page that took them to a reallocation 
screen. The reallocation screen showed the graphing tool relevant for the participant’s 
experimental condition,
16 links to prospectuses, the current percentage allocations across the four 
mutual funds, and a note about the international fund’s redemption fee. Four input boxes allowed 
participants to specify what their new portfolio allocation should be. Trades were executed at the 
next close of the U.S. markets and could be cancelled by the participant any time up to then. 
 
H. Exit questionnaire 
At the end of the one-year investment period, we administered an exit questionnaire to 
participants. We will use in our analysis the questions that elicited beliefs about stock market 
return autocorrelations and the effect study participation had on participants’ attention to market 
fluctuations. Of the 597 participants, 569 (95%) completed the exit questionnaire. 
 
II. First experiment results 
A. Participant characteristics 
Table 2 displays demographic and financial summary statistics on our participants, which 
were collected in the questionnaire administered immediately after the initial portfolio allocation. 
Men slightly outnumber women, and the young are slightly overrepresented in our sample—33% 
                                                 
15 We used Yahoo! Finance for our dividend and price data. On July 1, 2008, Yahoo! erroneously reported a money 
market fund dividend of 28.8 cents per dollar invested, which was deposited into 339 of our subjects’ accounts. The 
mean excess windfall was 4.5% of portfolio value. After the market close on July 31, 2008, we sent an e-mail to the 
affected subjects informing them of the error and (if applicable) how it had affected the July 5 weekly return 
reported to them. We let them keep the windfall but reallocated it (at the same time the e-mail was sent) in 
accordance with the subjects’ initially chosen asset allocation. This reallocation raised average equity allocations by 
1.0 percentage points among subjects receiving weekly e-mails and 2.2 percentage points among subjects receiving 
biannual e-mails. 
16 The graphs shown to a given subject remained constant throughout the experimental period. That is, they were not 
updated in real time to reflect new returns that had been realized since the start of the experiment.  13 
of participants are 35 or younger—although all ages have substantial representation. Our 
participants are relatively well-educated, with 56% reporting holding a bachelor’s degree or 
higher. The high average level of education may be due to our request for participants with 
annual incomes above $35,000; only 5% of participants report an income less than that threshold, 
and the median participant reports an income between $50,001 and $75,000. The median 
participant reports total bank, brokerage, and retirement account assets of about $75,000, and 
29% of our sample reports assets in excess of $100,000. Only 20% of our sample reports holding 
no stocks whatsoever in their personal portfolio. 
Since the experimental setup was simple (from the perspective of an individual 
participant) and the assets were passively managed funds in familiar asset classes, participants 
did not necessarily need a long time to make a considered decision. The median participant who 
received no historical returns information took 14 minutes between login and submission of the 
initial portfolio allocation, as did the median participant who was only given the historical 
returns distributions of portfolios invested 100% in a single asset class. The median participant 
who was able to see the historical returns distribution of any portfolio mix took 13 minutes.
17 
 
B. Average asset allocations 
Participants initially allocated 65.7% of their portfolio to equities—with 34.8% invested 
in international equities and 30.9% invested in domestic equities—18.6% to bonds, and 15.8% to 
money markets. The relatively high allocation to international equities may be due to this asset 
class’s strong performance in the time immediately preceding the experiment. The most recent 
one-year before-tax return reported in the fund prospectus was 25.76% for the international index 
fund, versus only 15.56% for the domestic equity index fund. Participants initially held positive 
amounts in 3.66 asset classes out of 4, on average.  
 
C. Return viewing frequency 
  Table 3 shows that our periodic e-mails to participants were successful at creating 
significant variation in the frequency with which they visited the study website and viewed their 
returns. During the one-year investment period, participants who received weekly e-mails logged 
                                                 
17 We report medians because of outliers for whom the time between initial login and initial portfolio submission 
was extremely long. These subjects likely made their allocation over the course of more than one sitting.  14 
into the website 60.7 times on average, versus only 18.2 times for participants who received 
biannual e-mails. Under the weekly e-mail treatment, 45.3 of those 60.7 logins occurred because 
participants clicked on an e-mailed link to view the screen with their ongoing returns. Thus, 
compliance with the link-clicking requests was high; 87.2% of weekly links sent were clicked 
within a week of receipt. In the biannual e-mail treatment, participants clicked 73.8% of links 
sent, so they saw the returns screen an average of 1.5 times. Participants in both treatments 
logged in about 16 times on average when not prompted by an e-mail. 
  The extra return viewings by participants who received weekly e-mails did not merely 
crowd out or coincide with return viewing that they would have engaged in anyway. In the exit 
questionnaire, we asked participants, “Did participating in this study make you see the ups and 
downs of the market more often than you otherwise would have?” Participants could respond 
that participation made them see the fluctuations “more often,” “less often,” or that it had “no 
effect.” In the weekly e-mail treatment, 79% of participants reported that participation made 
them see the ups and downs of the market more often, versus 57% of participants in the biannual 
e-mail treatment. Because these responses do not indicate how much more often study 
participation made them see returns, this 22% gap (p < 0.01) likely understates the effect being in 
the weekly treatment had on return viewing relative to being in the biannual treatment. Only 1% 
of participants in the weekly e-mail treatment and 2% of participants in the biannual e-mail 
treatment reported that the study caused them to see market fluctuations less often. 
  The fact that a $1 payment was sufficient to induce participants to view their portfolio 
returns almost every week indicates that they did not find such viewing to be particularly painful, 
even though this portfolio return was likely to be quite informative about the returns of their total 
financial portfolio. Andries and Haddad (2013) and Pagel (2013) present theoretical models 
where people are inattentive to their portfolios because they trade off the benefit of improved 
economic choices from better information against the fear of learning negative news. The high 
return-viewing compliance we obtain from a $1 payment places an upper bound on how strong 
this fear can be. 
 
D. Effect of returns aggregation on asset allocations 
Our main dependent variable is the fraction of the experimental portfolio that is invested 
in equities at the beginning of the experiment. Any effect of the historical returns graphs would  15 
likely be most easily detected in the initial allocation, immediately after all participants in the 
graph conditions were required to view the graphs. The previous literature on return feedback 
frequency also finds that individuals who know they will receive frequent feedback reduce their 
demand for risky assets starting in the very first period of the experiments, indicating that they 
prospectively anticipate the disutility from disaggregated ongoing return disclosure.
18 In Section 
III.B, we show that our results do not meaningfully change when we consider allocations at later 
dates. 
  The first column of Table 4 reports coefficients from OLS regressions where the 
dependent variable is the total fraction of the portfolio invested in equities at the beginning of the 
experiment and the explanatory variables are treatment dummies. We find that anticipating 
biannual rather than weekly e-mails had a 0.0 percentage point effect on equity shares. We can 
reject at the 95% confidence level the hypothesis that the increase is more than 3.6 percentage 
points, which would be a treatment effect that is an order of magnitude smaller than the 28.7 
percentage point increase Thaler et al. (1997) find when participants are shown yearly ongoing 
returns rather than monthly ongoing returns.
19 We also find that telling participants that they 
would see ongoing returns consolidated at the portfolio level rather than separately by each asset 
insignificantly decreased equity investment by 1.7 percentage points, with a 95% confidence 
interval of -5.4% to 2.0%. 
Simply being exposed to any historical returns graph significantly raised the initial equity 
share by 9.2 to 11.2 percentage points relative to not having access to a historical returns graph, 
which suggests that some participants were unaware how attractive stock returns have been 
historically. But it does not matter for total equity allocations whether the distributions of one-
year returns or five-year annualized returns are presented. In fact—contrary to the increases in 
equity allocations ranging from 19 to 41 percentage points found by Benartzi and Thaler (1999) 
when their participants were shown simulated 30-year return distributions rather than one-year 
return distributions—our participants who saw the historical five-year return distributions 
initially allocated less to equities than participants who saw the historical one-year return 
distributions, although the difference is not statistically significant (95% confidence interval 
                                                 
18 See Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003), Bellemare et al. (2005), and Haigh and List 
(2006). 
19 It is difficult to compare our treatment effect magnitudes with those of Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy, 
Kapteyn, and Potters (2003), Bellemare et al. (2005), Haigh and List (2006), and van der Heijden et al. (2012), since 
they only offer subjects assets with binary payoffs.  16 
from -5.7% to 1.6%).
20 Nor does it seem to matter whether participants were able to see the 
historical return distributions of any mix of asset classes instead of only portfolios invested 
entirely in a single asset class. Being able to see the mixed asset class distributions is associated 
with an insignificant 0.5 percentage point increase in equity allocations (95% confidence interval 
from -3.2% to 4.2%). 
The subsequent columns of Table 4 show the treatment effect estimates for each of the 
four asset classes separately. Less frequent ongoing return viewing and being able to see asset 
class mixes in the historical returns graph have no significant effect on allocations to any asset 
class. Portfolio-level reporting has a significant effect only on U.S. stock allocations, but with a 
negative sign, which is the opposite of what Anagol and Gamble (2013) predict. The most 
interesting results are for the one-year versus five-year historical graph treatments. We find that 
seeing the five-year graph instead of the one-year graph significantly (p < 0.01) increased 
allocations to U.S. stocks by 4.2 percentage points. Thus, we qualitatively replicate the Benartzi 
and Thaler (1999) result, which tested the aggregation of historical U.S. stock return 
distributions. However, aggregation in the graph also significantly (p < 0.01) decreased 
allocations to international stocks by 6.3 percentage points, which is why the overall equity 
allocation did not change significantly. 
Figures 2 and 3 give some insight into why aggregation decreases allocations to 
international stocks. Figure 2 shows each asset class’s return from 1971 to 2007, sorted from the 
worst one-year return to the best one-year return, while Figure 3 shows the analogous figure for 
five-year annualized returns. The data in these graphs match the data shown to participants in the 
graph treatments, although participants could only see information for one to two asset classes at 
a time. 
In the one-year return graph, international stock returns particularly stand out against the 
other asset classes in the right tail. The largest international stock return is twice the magnitude 
of the largest U.S. stock return, and the second-largest international stock return is 1.6 times the 
second-largest U.S. stock return. Everywhere else in the distribution, international stocks have 
returns that are mostly similar to U.S. stocks. In contrast, in the five-year return graph, the 
                                                 
20 Although using simulated 30-year returns in the long-horizon condition, as Benartzi and Thaler (1999) did, 
produces a starker contrast against one-year returns, simulated returns are difficult to explain to ordinary investors 
and are thus less likely to be employed in a real-world educational intervention. Reasonable five-year distributions 
can be computed from our 37-year historical sample period without resorting to simulation.   17 
international stock returns in the right tail are closer to the U.S. stock returns—1.2 times at the 
maximum and 1.5 times at the second-largest value—and they are below U.S. stock returns in 
much of the remainder of the distribution. Hence, international stocks look relatively less 
attractive in the five-year graph. 
In the online appendix, we show that the salience theory of Bordalo, Gennaioli, and 
Shleifer (2012), which is motivated by intuitions about the disproportionate influence of salient 
states like what we have just described, can reproduce the pattern of increased U.S. stock 
allocations and decreased international stock allocations as participants move from the one-year 
graphs to the five-year graphs. However, a number of modeling choices must be made to apply 
their theory to our setting, and the results are sensitive to these choices. 
The historical graph aggregation effects contrast with what would be predicted if 
participants used valuations produced by a piecewise linear loss-averse value function or 
cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). To perform these calculations, we 
assume that participants who saw the one-year graphs perceived each asset class to have 37 
possible return realizations corresponding to the 37 annual returns shown in its one-year graph, 
participants who saw five-year graphs perceived each asset class to have 33 possible realizations 
corresponding to the 33 five-year annualized returns shown in its five-year graph, and each 
possible realization occurs with equal probability. We use the preference parameter values 
estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
21 
The first and third columns of Table 5 show the valuation of each asset class by an 
individual with piecewise linear loss aversion or cumulative prospect theory preferences, 
respectively, who perceives return distributions shown in the one-year return graphs (Panel A) or 
the five-year return graphs (Panel B). The valuations of all the asset classes rise in the five-year 
graph condition relative to the one-year graph condition. Since participants cannot increase 
allocations to every asset class as they move from the one-year to the five-year graph condition, 
valuations relative to the mean asset class valuation within a condition are more relevant for 
                                                 
21 In the piecewise linear loss averse case, the valuation of a lottery is given by  !!!(!!) ! , where !! is the 
probability of state s occurring, !! is the lottery payout in state s, and ! ! = ! if ! ≥ 0 and ! ! = !" if ! < 0. In 
the cumulative prospect theory case, states are ordered such that !! < !! if ! < !. Let –m to –1 be the index values of 
states with negative payouts, and 0 to n be the index values of states with weakly positive payouts. The valuation of 
a lottery is given by  !!!(!!) ! , where !! = !! !! + ⋯+ !! − !! !!!! + ⋯+ !!  if 0 ≤ ! ≤ ! and 
!! = !! !!! + ⋯+ !! − !! !!! + ⋯+ !!!!  if −! ≤ ! < 0, ! ! = !! if ! ≥ 0 and ! ! = −!(−!)! if 
! < 0, !! ! = !!/[(!! + 1 − ! !)!/!], and !! ! = !!/[(!! + 1 − ! !)!/!. Tversky and Kahenman (1992) 
estimate α = β = 0.88, λ = 2.25, γ = 0.61, and δ = 0.69.  18 
determining portfolio shares than the absolute valuation. The second and fourth columns show 
these relative valuations. Under both piecewise linear loss aversion and cumulative prospect 
theory, moving from the one-year return graph to the five-year return graph causes U.S. equities 
and international equities to look relatively more attractive, which is contrary to our empirical 
finding that international stock allocations fall when going from the one-year graph to the five-
year graph condition. 
 
III. First experiment robustness checks  
A. Interactions with strength of loss aversion and mental accounting 
Aggregating reported returns is thought to increase risk-taking because individuals are 
loss averse and engage in mental accounting, and aggregation encourages the integration of 
multiple gambles into a single mental account. It is possible, then, that we would find positive 
aggregation effects on equity shares among a subset of individuals who are particularly prone to 
loss aversion and mental accounting, even though there are no positive effects on average over 
our entire sample. We identify such individuals as the 47% of our sample who rejected the equal 
chance of winning $8 or losing $5, a choice that is difficult to explain in the absence of myopic 
loss aversion (Rabin, 2000; Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006). 
Table 6 adds interactions between the treatment dummies and a dummy variable for 
rejecting the small gamble to the Table 4 total equity regression. We find no significant evidence 
of positive aggregation effects on equity allocations among the participants who reject the small 
gamble. The point estimate of the biannual e-mail treatment effect is 2.5 percentage points higher 
among gamble rejecters than gamble accepters, but this difference is not significant. The overall 
biannual e-mail effect among gamble rejecters, –1.6 + 2.5 = 0.9 percentage points, is not 
significantly different from zero. Reporting portfolio-level returns causes gamble rejecters’ 
equity allocations to change by –2.9 + 2.5 = –0.4 percentage points, but this difference too is not 
significant. Gamble rejecters who saw the five-year graphs allocated a statistically insignificant 
6.4 + 6.0 – (12.2 – 1.6) = 1.8 percentage points more to equities than gamble rejecters who saw 
the one-year graph, and gamble rejecters who were able to see graphed return distributions of 
asset class mixes allocated an insignificant –1.4 + 3.7 = 2.3 percentage points more to equities 
than gamble rejecters who could see only single asset class return distributions. 
  19 
B. Do aggregation effects emerge with a delay? 
  The participants in Gneezy and Potters (1997), Gneezy, Kapteyn, and Potters (2003), 
Bellemare et al. (2005), and Haigh and List (2006) did not need to first experience disaggregated 
ongoing return disclosure before reducing their portfolio risk. Instead, they reduced their demand 
for risky assets starting in the very first period of the experiments. It is nevertheless possible that 
our participants initially did not realize how disaggregated ongoing return disclosure would 
affect their utility, but they gradually learned as they became exposed to these returns. This 
would lead to a relative decrease in the disaggregated groups’ portfolio risk as the experiment 
progressed. Our participants were not inactive in their experimental accounts; the median 
number of days on which a participant made a reallocation is 2, and the average is 4.6. 
  We test for the gradual emergence of a positive aggregation effect on risk-taking by using 
the equity share halfway into the experimental period as the dependent variable in the first 
column of Table 7, and equity share at the end of the experiment as the dependent variable in the 
second column. Equity share at the halfway point is measured eight days after participants 
receiving weekly e-mails got their 26th e-mailed returns-checking link, and eight days after 
participants receiving biannual e-mails got their first returns-checking link.
22 
  The coefficient estimates indicate that throughout the investment period, reporting 
ongoing returns on an aggregated basis did not significantly increase portfolio risk-taking. The 
point estimate of the biannual e-mail treatment effect grows slightly from the 0.0 percentage 
points at the beginning of the investment period (in Table 4) to 2.4 percentage points at the 
halfway point, and it flips sign to –1.4 percentage points at the end of the experiment. The 
portfolio-level return reporting treatment effect also attenuates from –1.7 percentage points (in 
Table 4) to an insignificant 0.1 percentage points at the halfway point and an insignificant –1.2 
percentage points at the end of the experiment. Although having seen historical returns graphs 
continued to raise equity share by about 7 to 9 percentage points through the remainder of the 
experiment, it still does not matter whether one-year or five-year return distributions were 
shown. Those seeing five-year graphs held 1.7 percentage points more in equities than those 
                                                 
22 By measuring allocations at this point, we capture the allocations of subjects receiving both weekly and biannual 
e-mails right after they have been induced to see their returns on the website via an e-mailed link. It may be 
particularly convenient to reallocate one’s experimental portfolio right after clicking on the e-mailed link. Therefore, 
biannual subjects have had a chance to adjust their portfolios in response to market movements and the reporting 
regime via the same convenient channel weekly subjects had had available each week for the prior six months.  20 
seeing one-year graphs at the halfway mark, and 1.5 percentage points less at the end of the 
experiment, but the differences are not significant. 
 
C. Are our aggregation effects null because of negative expected equity returns? 
  Could our null effects be driven by some participants believing that the expected return of 
equities is negative due to the market’s drop prior to the experiment? The same logic that causes 
gambles with positive expected returns to appear more attractive under aggregation causes 
gambles with negative expected returns to appear less attractive under aggregation. 
The fact that our participants initially allocated an average of 65.7% of their portfolio to 
equities suggests that they did not in fact believe that the expected return on equities was 
negative. We further test this story by running regressions of initial equity share on the treatment 
dummies and their interactions with a dummy for a participant believing that market returns 
follow a random walk. The pre-experiment market decline is unlikely to cause somebody who 
believes in random walk returns to forecast a negative equity premium. We classify a participant 
as believing in random walk returns if he said in the exit questionnaire that neither a 10% 
increase nor a 10% decrease in the market last month should affect one’s forecast of the market’s 
return next month. Table 8 shows these regression results. Contrary to the hypothesis that our 
treatment effects are attenuated by the market’s drop prior to the experiment, we find no 
significantly positive aggregation treatment effects among those who believe in random walk 
returns. 
 
IV. Second viewing frequency experiment design 
  Our first experiment’s results can be reconciled with the Benartzi and Thaler (1999) 
finding that seeing longer-horizon historical U.S. stock return distributions increases investment 
in U.S. equities, since we replicate their result on U.S. equity investments but also find that it 
does not generalize to other return distributions. On the other hand, our first experiment offers no 
reconciliation with the previous literature’s findings that more aggregated disclosure of ongoing 
returns increases risk-taking. This inconsistency is especially surprising for the return viewing 
frequency treatment, since many different experimenters have replicated this effect. 
Our first experiment is not well-suited to identify what causes the return viewing 
frequency effect to disappear, since many aspects of its design differ from the previous  21 
literature’s experiments. In this section, we describe a follow-up experiment that starts with the 
classic Gneezy and Potters (1997) design and modifies it step by step to move closer to our first 
experiment’s design.
23 Our objective is to see which modifications eliminate the return viewing 
frequency effect. 
Our follow-up experiment allows us to study five dimensions along which our first 
experiment differs from the Gneezy and Potters (1997) experiment: 
1.  The risky asset in Gneezy and Potters (1997) has an extreme binary distribution: a 2/3 
probability of a -100% net return and a 1/3 probability of a 250% net return (i.e., the 
investment amount plus 2.5 times the investment amount would be returned to the 
participant). Such return realizations are historically unprecedented for the diversified 
asset classes in our first experiment. 
2.  The risky asset in Gneezy and Potters (1997) is an artificial laboratory asset with which 
participants were unlikely to have had prior experience. Participants are much more 
likely to have contextual knowledge about the real financial assets offered in our first 
experiment, which could have caused them to apply context-specific heuristics such as, 
“Allocate 100 minus my age to stocks,” which might blunt the effect of aggregation 
manipulations on portfolio choices. 
3.  The risky asset realizations in Gneezy and Potters (1997) were shown within the course 
of a single 40-minute experimental session. The returns in our first experiment were 
revealed over the course of one year. 
4.  At the beginning of each round of Gneezy and Potters (1997), participants were given an 
endowment, and they could invest any portion of this endowment in the risky asset. After 
the risky asset’s outcome was seen, participants were given a fresh endowment, and 
earnings from previous rounds were not available to invest in the current round. 
Therefore, each return-viewing event may have also been perceived as a portfolio 
liquidation event. In contrast, when participants viewed returns in our first experiment, 
they were not forced to liquidate their portfolios. In the realization utility models of 
Barberis and Xiong (2009, 2012), investors receive gain-loss utility from returns only 
when they sell a security, not when they view its returns. Therefore, the return viewing 
                                                 
23 Like other authors in the myopic loss aversion literature, we choose to base these experiments on the Gneezy and 
Potters (1997) design rather than the Thaler et al. (1997) design because the former is a purer demonstration of 
myopic loss aversion, while the latter incorporates elements of memory and inference as well.  22 
frequency effect of Gneezy and Potters (1997) may really be a liquidation frequency 
effect. 
5.  Gneezy and Potters ran their experiment on Tilburg University students, whereas our first 
experiment was run on a non-student population. 
 
We recruited experimental participants in two waves, the first in Spring 2013 and the 
second in Fall 2013 after we had analyzed the results of the first sample. Participants were paid a 
$5 participation fee plus any experimental earnings. The first wave consisted of students in the 
Harvard Decision Science Laboratory subject pool, making the sample closely comparable to the 
Tilburg University students used by Gneezy and Potters. The second wave included both 
students and non-students in this subject pool, as well as participants recruited by distributing 
flyers on the Harvard campus. Only 38% of this second wave were full-time students. The S&P 
500 rose 16.0% in 2012 and 32.4% in 2013, so the experiment occurred in a bull market 
environment. 
Participants in the first wave participated in both an in-lab study and a post-lab study. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four in-lab conditions, and independently 
randomly assigned to one of four post-lab conditions. Within each condition, each participant 
was randomly assigned to a high-frequency viewing treatment or a low-frequency viewing 
treatment. Participants in the second wave participated only in the in-lab study. The online 
appendix contains the experimental instructions. 
The first in-lab condition was a direct replication of Gneezy and Potters (1997). 
Participants made choices for nine rounds. Participants in the high-frequency treatment received 
a $2 endowment each round and could bet any amount from $0 to $2 in a gamble that had a 2/3 
probability of a -100% net return and a 1/3 probability of a 250% net return. Participants kept 
any amount that was not bet. Gamble earnings and amounts not bet from previous rounds could 
not be bet in the current round. Participants knew that the outcome of each round’s gamble 
would be revealed to them immediately after each round. Participants in the low-frequency 
treatment also received $2 per round, but they had to make investment decisions for three rounds 
at a time. For example, in round 1, they chose how much they would invest in rounds 1 through 
3. Per-round investment amounts were constrained to be the same within each block of three.  23 
Participants knew that they would learn the outcomes of the three gambles for each block 
simultaneously instead of one by one. 
The second in-lab condition, which we call the “scaled Gneezy-Potters” condition, 
modified the first in-lab condition by scaling down the percentage returns of the risky asset to a 
2/3 chance of a -10% return and a 1/3 chance of a 25% return, which is within the realistic range 
of one-year returns on a diversified stock market investment. To keep the maximum possible 
dollars at risk the same, we increased the first period endowment to $20. In order to avoid 
creating significant wealth effects, we did not give participants a fresh $20 endowment each 
round. Instead, the gamble earnings and amount not bet from round t constituted the maximum 
allowable investment amount in round t + 1. Participants kept whatever balance remained at the 
end of round 9. Because the total balance available to bet changed from round to round, we had 
participants specify what percent of their endowment they wished to bet, rather than an absolute 
dollar amount as in the first condition. In the low-frequency treatment, this percentage was 
required to be constant within each three-round block. 
The third in-lab condition replaced the binary risky asset with an asset whose return 
distribution matched the historical U.S. stock market distribution. We explicitly labeled this asset 
the “stock market” in the instructions given to participants. Participants were told that each round 
corresponded to one month, and that we would randomly select a starting month between 
January 1923 and January 2010, with each month having an equal chance of being selected. If, 
for example, the starting month was March 1954, then the round 1 stock market return would be 
the actual March 1954 U.S. stock market return, the round 2 stock market return would be the 
actual April 1954 U.S. stock market return, etc. The instructions showed participants a histogram 
of historical monthly stock returns from 1923 to 2012.
24 There were 18 total rounds, and 
participants began with a $20 endowment. In the high-frequency treatment, participants made an 
allocation choice at the beginning of each round. The instructions said, “At the end of each 
round, you will learn how much money you gained or lost and your resulting balance. Your stock 
market investment will then be completely sold, and you must decide what percent of your total 
balance you wish to invest in the stock market for the next round.” Therefore, we retained the 
coincidence of return viewing and portfolio liquidation in this condition. At the end of each 
                                                 
24 These histograms had the return magnitude on the horizontal access and the percent of months with this return on 
the vertical axis. These differ from the historical return graphs shown in our experiment.  24 
round, participants were told, “Your stock market investment has been completely sold.” 
Although this liquidation has no economic meaning, it may be psychologically meaningful.
25 A 
participant’s experimental earnings equaled her balance at the end of round 18. In the low-
frequency treatment, participants made portfolio choices at the beginning of rounds 1, 7, and 13, 
and saw only their cumulated six-round returns at the end of rounds 6, 12, and 18. The six-round 
frequency matches the frequency of paid return viewings in our first experiment’s biannual 
viewing treatment. Portfolios were not rebalanced within each six-round block, so the percent 
invested in stock would move with the risky asset’s return, but the instructions told participants 
that their portfolio would be liquidated every six rounds. 
The fourth in-lab condition was identical to the third, except that we did not force 
liquidation each time a return was viewed. The instructions said that after seeing returns, “you 
will have the option of holding onto your stock market investment from the last round or 
changing the percent of your balance invested in the stock market.” The computer screen 
eliciting the participant’s investment choice showed two radio buttons labeled “Keep current 
stock holdings” and “Change stock holdings.” If the participant chose the second button, she was 
asked to specify what percent she wished to invest in the stock market. 
The four post-lab conditions mirrored the in-lab conditions, except that the amount of real 
time that elapsed between rounds was one week. In the Gneezy-Potters replication condition, 
there were three post-lab rounds. At the beginning of the first round, which occurred at the end 
of the laboratory session, participants in the high-frequency treatment chose an amount between 
$0 and $2 to bet in an asset that had a 2/3 chance of a -100% return and a 1/3 chance of a 250% 
return. The investment principal was taken from their experimental earnings in the in-lab session 
excluding their $5 participation fee.
26 At the end of each subsequent week, participants received 
an email with the outcome of the gamble and a link to an online survey. The survey asked the 
participant to enter the result of the gamble (to confirm that she had seen it) and how much she 
wished to bet in the next round. If the participant filled out the survey within five days of the 
email being sent, we added $1 to her final payment. The next round’s bet amount equaled the 
previous round’s bet amount for participants who did not fill out the survey within five days. The 
                                                 
25 Weber and Camerer (1998) find that when shares are automatically sold at the end of each period in an 
experimental market, subjects’ disposition effect is greatly reduced even though they can buy their previous position 
back costlessly, rendering the liquidation economically meaningless. 
26 For subjects who earned less than $6 in the in-lab session, the bet amount was limited to one-third of their 
earnings.  25 
third and final survey did not ask for a bet amount. After the last survey, we mailed participants a 
payment equal to their final balance plus any survey completion payments they earned.  
Participants in the low-frequency treatment in the Gneezy-Potters replication condition 
chose a per-round gamble amount that was constrained to be identical across post-laboratory 
rounds. The cumulative outcome was only revealed to them in an email sent three weeks in the 
future. The email also contained a link to a survey that asked what the result of the gambles 
were. If participants filled out the survey within five days of the email being sent, we added $3 to 
their final payment.  
The second post-lab condition modified the asset to have a 2/3 chance of a -10% return 
and a 1/3 chance of a 25% return. Participants specified what percent of their ending in-lab 
balance (excluding their $5 participation fee) they wished to bet, and balances rolled over from 
round to round, as in the second in-lab condition. High-frequency treatment participants chose 
their bet percentages each week, while low-frequency treatment participants chose one bet 
percentage that applied to all three rounds. 
The third post-lab condition lasted for six weekly rounds, and the risky asset’s returns 
were drawn from one historical U.S. stock market return sequence, as in the third in-lab 
condition. Participants in the high-frequency condition were told that their investment would be 
completely liquidated at the end of each round, and they would have to choose a new allocation 
each week. These participants were paid $1 for completing each of six post-lab surveys about 
their realized return and new portfolio choice. Participants in the low-frequency condition were 
only told their six-round return at the end of six weeks, and they were paid $6 for completing one 
survey at that time. 
The fourth post-lab condition was like the third, except it did not force liquidation at the 
end of each round in the high-frequency treatment. The post-lab surveys allowed participants to 
click a radio button to keep their current stock holdings. The low-frequency treatment was 
identical to the low-frequency treatment in the third post-lab condition. 
 
V. Second viewing frequency experiment results 
  We recruited 320 participants in Wave 1 and another 320 participants in Wave 2. This 
allowed us to assign 80 participants to each in-lab condition and 80 participants to each post-lab 
condition. Based on the means and standard deviations reported in Gneezy and Potters (1997), a  26 
sample size of 80 gives us 79.9% power to detect an effect of their reported magnitude at 5% 
significance in the replication condition. 
  Panel A of Table 9 reports regression results from the in-lab conditions for Wave 1 
participants. The dependent variable is the percent of the available endowment that is invested in 
the risky asset in each round. We find that we do not obtain the Gneezy and Potters (1997) 
viewing frequency result in our replication condition. The infrequent returns reporting treatment 
dummy coefficient is 4.8%, which has the predicted sign but is insignificant. Scaling the risky 
asset payoffs down by a factor of ten causes the infrequent returns reporting treatment effect to 
flip sign, so that infrequent reporting actually reduces risky asset investment by 7.8 percentage 
points, although this effect is not significant. Further modifying the risky asset payoffs to match 
the stock market return distribution does not resurrect the Gneezy and Potters effect, whether 
portfolio liquidation is forced upon return viewing or not. The treatment coefficients in these last 
two conditions are insignificant. 
  The Wave 1 in-lab results raised a question: Is our failure to find a viewing frequency 
effect in the replication condition the result of Type II error, or is the original Gneezy and Potters 
(1997) result a Type I error and the subsequent successful replications in the literature are due to 
publication bias? To answer this question, we re-ran the in-lab conditions on Wave 2 
participants. Panel B of Table 9 shows that in this second sample, viewing returns less frequently 
did increase risk-taking robustly in the replication condition. The effect’s magnitude is 26.9 
percentage points, which is much larger than the 16.9 percentage point effect reported by Gneezy 
and Potters (1997), and highly significant (p < 0.0001). If we pool the Wave 1 and Wave 2 
samples, the effect is a 15.8 percentage point increase that is significant at the 1% level (p = 
0.002). We conclude that our failure to replicate in Wave 1 was due to Type II error, which we 
expected to occur with 20% probability. In the scaled-down Gneezy-Potters condition and the 
two stock conditions, we continue to find no significant effects, and each point estimate has the 
opposite sign of what we found in Wave 1.
27 Therefore, these effects appear to be true nulls. 
  In Table 10, we report regressions results from the post-lab conditions, which were run 
only on Wave 1 participants. These regressions are analogous to the in-lab regressions in Table 
9. We find that in none of the four conditions does infrequent return viewing significantly affect 
the fraction of the available endowment invested in the risky asset. The null effect in the post-lab 
                                                 
27 Pooling Waves 1 and 2 does not qualitatively change the significance of these three treatment effects.  27 
Gneezy-Potters replication condition is not simply due to participants in the Wave 1 in-lab 
replication condition being less susceptible to infrequent return viewing. Because assignment to 
the post-lab conditions was independent of assignment to the in-lab conditions, 75% of 
participants in the post-lab replication condition were not in the in-lab replication condition.  
Our follow-up experimental results indicate that the effect of return viewing frequency on 
risk-taking appears to depend on the risky asset having extreme percentage returns and the 
returns being viewed immediately after the portfolio choice is made. Scaling down the risky 
asset’s percentage returns while keeping the total dollars participants can put at risk constant 
causes the viewing frequency effect to disappear, as does creating a one-week or longer delay 
between when the choice is made and the first portfolio return is shown. These findings suggest 
that both the distribution of the asset returns and the experimental time horizon are responsible 
for the null effects in our first experiment. Because the return viewing effect in the in-lab 
replication condition is stronger in Wave 2, which contained many more non-student participants 
than Wave 1, and neither wave showed significant return-viewing effects in the other three in-lab 
conditions, our first experiment’s null results do not appear to be driven by the fact that its 
participants are not students. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Many financial behaviors are difficult to explain unless loss aversion and/or mental 
accounting are important determinants of economic choices. Such behaviors include aversion to 
small-stakes risks with positive expected values (Rabin, 2000; Rabin and Thaler, 2001), the 
tendency to sell stocks with paper gains and hold stocks with paper losses (Shefrin and Statman, 
1985; Odean, 1998), and the failure to consider the asset allocation of non-salient accounts when 
making allocation decisions in a salient account (Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2009). Myopic 
loss aversion has also been proposed as a resolution of the equity premium puzzle (Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1995; Barberis, Huang, and Santos, 2001; Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006). 
It thus seems plausible that the boundaries of investors’ mental accounts can be 
manipulated by changes in information disclosure in order to increase risky asset demand. The 
experimental evidence to date has found that indeed, reporting only aggregated outcomes of 
multiple gambles increases participants’ willingness to take risks. However, these previous 
experiments abstracted away from certain features of the real-world investment environment that  28 
may moderate such effects outside the laboratory. In particular, previous experiments have all 
taken place within a single session and have used laboratory assets. In order to gauge the 
potential impact of disclosure policy, our first experiment had participants invest in real financial 
assets over the course of an entire year.  
We find that disclosing returns at a more aggregated level does not increase portfolio 
risk-taking. Further analysis and a second experiment indicate that the effect of aggregated return 
disclosure is highly sensitive to the distribution of the risky asset’s returns and the amount of 
time that elapses between the portfolio choice and the return disclosure. Thus, aggregated return 
disclosure does not appear to be a policy lever that can be used by financial institutions to 
robustly affect average portfolio risk choices. 
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This table reports the number of subjects that were assigned to each experimental cell. 
Panel A contains cells where ongoing returns were reported only at the aggregated 
portfolio level. Panel B contains cells where ongoing returns were reported separately by 
each asset held by the subject. 
Panel A: Ongoing returns reported at portfolio level 
  Return viewing inducement frequency 
Historical return graph shown  Weekly  Biannual 
None  60  60 
1-year returns, single asset classes  30  30 
5-year returns, single asset classes  29  30 
1-year returns, portfolio mixes allowed 30  30 
5-year returns, portfolio mixes allowed 30  30 
Panel B: Ongoing returns reported separately by asset 
  Return viewing inducement frequency 
Historical return graph shown  Weekly  Biannual 
1-year returns, single asset classes  30  29 
5-year returns, single asset classes  30  30 
1-year returns, portfolio mixes allowed 30  30 
5-year returns, portfolio mixes allowed 30  29 
 Table 2. Subject Characteristics 
 
Percent male  56%  Financial assets in bank,   
    brokerage, and retirement   
Age    accounts   
  25  2%  < $25,000  27% 
26-35  31%  $25,001 - $50,000  13% 
36-45  22%  $50,001 - $75,000  10% 
46-55  19%  $75,001 - $100,000  9% 
55-65  13%  > $100,000  29% 
  66  13%  Prefer not to answer  12% 
      
Education    Percent of outside financial    
Some high school  1%  assets invested in stocks at   
High school graduate  10%  beginning of experiment   
Some college  23%  0%  20% 
Associate’s degree  10%  1 - 25%  32% 
Bachelor’s degree  28%  26 - 50%  17% 
Some graduate school  7%  51 - 75%  15% 
Graduate degree  21%  76 - 100%  8% 
    Prefer not to answer  9% 
Annual household income       
< $35,000  5%     
$35,000 - $50,000  21%     
$50,001 - $75,000  29%     
$75,001 - $100,000  19%     
> $100,000  21%     
Prefer not to answer  5%     
 
   Table 3. Website Visits After Initial Allocation 
This table shows, by return viewing inducement frequency, the average number of total 
visits to the study website per subject, the average total viewings of the returns screens 
per subject, and the average fraction of the available returns screens that were viewed by 
each subject. “Total visits to the website” include visits that involved viewing a returns 
screen. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
  Return viewing inducement frequency  p-value of 
difference    Weekly  Biannual 
Total visits to website  60.7  18.2  0.000 
  (2.6)  (1.9)   
Viewings of returns   45.3  1.5  0.000 
   screens from e-mail links  (0.7)  (0.0)   
Fraction of possible e-mail link    87.2%  73.8%  0.000 
   returns screens viewed   (1.9)  (2.5)   
 
 
  Table 4. Aggregation Effects on Initial Allocations 
The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities in total or to 
each asset class at the start of the experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether 
the subject was sent an e-mail with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-
level return reporting is a dummy for whether the subject’s ongoing returns were 
reported only at the consolidated portfolio level. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether 
the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy 
for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-year historical returns. Asset class 
mixes shown is a dummy for whether the subject saw a historical returns graphing tool 
that could show distributions of arbitrary asset class mixes. Point estimates from an OLS 
regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  Total 
equity  U.S. stock  Int’l stock  Bonds 
Money 
market 
Biannual e-mail  -0.0  -0.5  0.5  0.5  -0.5 
 ( 1 . 8 )   ( 1 . 5 )   ( 1 . 6 )   ( 1 . 1 )   ( 1 . 1 )  
Portfolio-level   -1.7  -4.1*  2.4  0.1  1.6 
return reporting  (1.9)  (1.6)  (1.8)  (1.2)  (1.2) 
1-year graph  11.2**  1.8  9.4**  -4.4**  -6.9** 
  (2.6)  (2.3)  (2.5)  (1.7)  (1.7) 
5-year graph  9.2**  6.0**  3.1  -3.2  -6.0** 
  (2.6)  (2.3)  (2.6)  (1.7)  (1.7) 
Asset class mixes  0.5  2.4  -1.9  -0.2  -0.3 
shown in graph  (1.9)  (1.6)  (1.8)  (1.2)  (1.2) 
Constant  58.3**  29.6**  28.8**  21.3**  20.3** 
 ( 2 . 8 )   ( 2 . 4 )   ( 2 . 6 )   ( 1 . 8 )   ( 1 . 8 )  
Sample size  597  597  597  597  597 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 
  Table 5. Asset Class Valuations Under Piecewise Linear Loss Aversion  
and Cumulative Prospect Theory 
The first and third columns of this table show the valuation of each asset class by an 
agent that has piecewise linear loss averse utility or cumulative prospect theory utility. In 
Panel A, this valuation is done assuming the agent perceives each historical one-year 
return realization of the asset class, as shown in the one-year historical return graphs, is 
equally likely in the future. In Panel B, the agent perceives each historical five-year 
annualized return realization of the asset class, as shown in the five-year historical return 
graphs, is equally likely in the future. The second and fourth columns show the deviation 
of each asset class’s valuation from the mean asset class valuation in its graph type × 
utility function cell. 
 
Panel A: One-year return graph 
  Piecewise linear loss aversion  Cumulative prospect theory 
 
Valuation 
Deviation from 
mean valuation  Valuation 
Deviation from 
mean valuation 
U.S. stocks  2.9%  0.7%  -2.5%  -2.3% 
Int’l stocks  3.6%  1.3%  0.7%  0.8% 
Bonds  1.8%  -0.5%  0.9%  1.0% 
Money market  0.7%  -1.5%  0.3%  0.5% 
Panel B: Five-year return graph 
  Piecewise linear loss aversion  Cumulative prospect theory 
 
Valuation 
Deviation from 
mean valuation  Valuation 
Deviation from 
mean valuation 
U.S. stocks  6.0%  1.9%  5.5%  1.3% 
Int’l stocks  6.3%  2.1%  7.3%  3.1% 
Bonds  3.3%  -0.9%  2.9%  -1.3% 
Money market  1.1%  -3.1%  1.1%  -3.1% 
    Table 6. Aggregation Effects on Initial Equity Allocation  
Interacted with Loss Aversion 
The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of 
the experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether the subject was sent an e-mail 
with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-level return reporting is a dummy 
for whether the subject’s ongoing returns were reported only at the consolidated portfolio 
level. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year 
historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs 
with five-year historical returns. Asset class mixes shown is a dummy for whether the 
subject saw a historical returns graphing tool that could show distributions of arbitrary 
asset class mixes. Loss averse is a dummy for whether the subject turned down the win 
$8/lose $5 gamble we offered. Point estimates from an OLS regression are shown, with 
standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Biannual e-mail  -1.6 
 ( 2 . 3 )  
Biannual  viewing ×  2.5 
Loss averse  (3.4) 
Portfolio-level return reporting  -2.9 
  (2.6) 
Portfolio-level return  2.5 
reporting × Loss averse  (3.7) 
1-year graph  12.2** 
  (3.7) 
1-year graph × Loss averse  -1.6 
  (5.3) 
5-year graph  6.4 
  (3.7) 
5-year graph × Loss averse  6.0 
  (5.3) 
Asset class mixes shown in graph  -1.4 
  (2.6) 
Asset class mixes shown  3.7 
× Loss averse ( 3 . 7 )  
Loss averse  -7.8 
 ( 5 . 5 )  
Constant  62.3** 
 ( 3 . 9 )  
Sample size                  597 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level.   Table 7. Aggregation Effects on Later Equity Allocations 
The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities 27 weeks into 
experimental participation or at the end of the experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy 
for whether the subject was sent an e-mail with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. 
Portfolio-level return reporting is a dummy for whether the subject’s ongoing returns 
were reported only at the consolidated portfolio level. 1-year graph is a dummy for 
whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year historical returns. 5-year graph is a 
dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with five-year historical returns. Asset 
class mixes shown is a dummy for whether the subject saw a historical returns graphing 
tool that could show distributions of arbitrary asset class mixes. Point estimates from an 
OLS regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  27 weeks  Final 
Biannual e-mail  2.4  -1.4 
  (2.1)  (2.2) 
Portfolio-level return reporting  0.1  -1.2 
  (2.4)  (2.4) 
1-year graph  7.4*  9.0** 
  (3.4)  (3.4) 
5-year graph  9.1**  7.5* 
  (3.4)  (3.4) 
Asset class mixes shown in graph  1.5  -1.0 
  (2.4)  (2.4) 
Constant  48.7**  54.6** 
 ( 3 . 5 )   ( 3 . 6 )  
Sample size  597  597 
 * Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 
  Table 8. Aggregation Effects on Initial Equity Allocation  
Interacted with Belief in Random Walk Returns 
The dependent variable is the percent of the portfolio allocated to equities at the start of 
the experiment. Biannual e-mail is a dummy for whether the subject was sent an e-mail 
with a link to his ongoing returns biannually. Portfolio-level return reporting is a dummy 
for whether the subject’s ongoing returns were reported only at the consolidated portfolio 
level. 1-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs with one-year 
historical returns. 5-year graph is a dummy for whether the subject was shown graphs 
with five-year historical returns. Asset class mixes shown is a dummy for whether the 
subject saw a historical returns graphing tool that could show distributions of arbitrary 
asset class mixes. Random walk is a dummy for whether the subject believes that neither 
a 10% increase in the market in one month nor a 10% decrease in the market in one 
month should affect one’s forecast of the market’s return next month. Point estimates 
from an OLS regression are shown, with standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Biannual e-mail  1.2 
 ( 2 . 4 )  
Biannual  viewing ×  -1.4 
Random walk  (3.4) 
Portfolio-level return reporting  -3.9 
  (2.7) 
Portfolio-level return  4.4 
reporting × Random walk  (3.8) 
1-year graph  7.4 
  (3.8) 
1-year graph × Random walk  7.0 
  (5.4) 
5-year graph  8.5** 
  (3.7) 
5-year graph × Random walk  1.8 
  (5.4) 
Asset class mixes shown in graph  -1.4 
  (2.7) 
Asset class mixes shown  4.3 
× Random walk ( 3 . 8 )  
Random walk  -2.6 
 ( 5 . 6 )  
Constant  59.2** 
 ( 3 . 9 )  
Sample size                  570 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 
  Table 9. In-Laboratory Aggregation Experiment Results 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the fraction of the 
endowment invested in the risky asset and the explanatory variable is a dummy for the 
subject having returns reported infrequently. Standard errors are clustered by subject. 
 
 
Gneezy-Potters 
replication 
Scaled Gneezy-
Potters 
Stock 
condition, 
forced 
liquidation 
Stock 
condition, no 
forced 
liquidation 
Panel A: Wave 1 
Infrequent   4.8  -7.8  -0.8  4.0 
return viewing  (7.8)  (8.0)  (7.0)  (6.9) 
Constant  48.2**  49.5**  48.7**  43.1** 
 ( 5 . 7 )   ( 5 . 8 )   ( 4 . 9 )   ( 4 . 9 )  
N  480  480  840  840 
Subjects  80  80  80  80 
Panel B: Wave 2 
Infrequent   26.9**  0.7  5.4  -5.7 
returns viewing  (6.0)  (6.7)  (7.0)  (5.9) 
Constant  32.9**  32.9**  36.7**  34.8** 
 ( 4 . 5 )   ( 5 . 0 )   ( 4 . 6 )   ( 4 . 5 )  
N  480  480  840  840 
Subjects  80  80  80  80 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 
 
 
Table 10. Post-Laboratory Aggregation Experiment Results 
This table shows regression results where the dependent variable is the fraction of the 
endowment invested in the risky asset in each round and the explanatory variable is a 
dummy for the subject having returns reported infrequently. Standard errors are clustered 
by subject. 
 
 
Gneezy-Potters 
replication 
Scaled Gneezy-
Potters 
Stock 
condition, 
forced 
liquidation 
Stock 
condition, no 
forced 
liquidation 
Infrequent   -2.8  6.6  -4.8  -10.0 
return viewing  (7.7)  (8.9)  (7.2)  (7.2) 
Constant  55.7**  40.9**  46.0**  50.4** 
 ( 5 . 1 )   ( 6 . 0 )   ( 4 . 6 )   ( 4 . 9 )  
N  160  160  280  280 
Subjects  80  80  80  80 
* Significant at 5% level. ** Significant at 1% level. 
 
  Figure 1. Experimental Period 
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Active subjects VIXFigure 2. 1-year asset class returns, 1971-2007, sorted from worst to best 
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